Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute in support of Appellants and Reversal of the District Court\u27s Decision, Federal Trade Commission and State of Minnesota v. Lundbeck, Inc. Nos. 10-3548 and 10-3549, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth District (2011) by Sagers, Christopher L. et al.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Briefs Faculty Scholarship
1-3-2011
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute
in support of Appellants and Reversal of the
District Court's Decision, Federal Trade
Commission and State of Minnesota v. Lundbeck,
Inc. Nos. 10-3548 and 10-3549, United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth District (2011)
Christopher L. Sagers
Cleveland State University, c.sagers@csuohio.edu
W. Joseph Bruckner
Lockridge, Grindal, Nauen, P.L.L.P.
RIchard M. Brunell
American Antitrust Institute
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_briefs
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Briefs and Court Filings is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Law Faculty Briefs by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
research.services@law.csuohio.edu.
Repository Citation
Sagers, Christopher L.; Bruckner, W. Joseph; and Brunell, RIchard M., "Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute in support
of Appellants and Reversal of the District Court's Decision, Federal Trade Commission and State of Minnesota v. Lundbeck, Inc. Nos.
10-3548 and 10-3549, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth District (2011)" (2011). Law Faculty Briefs. 11.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_briefs/11
Nos. 10-3548 and 10-3549
__________________________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION and STATE OF MINNESOTA, 
Appellants,
v.
LUNDBECK, INC.,
Appellee.
__________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota in Civil Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG) and 08-6381 (JNE/JJG)
__________________________
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE 
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS AND REVERSAL
OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION
__________________________
CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS W. JOSEPH BRUCKNER
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW, Counsel of Record
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL
1801 Euclid Ave., LB 138    NAUEN P.L.L.P.
Cleveland, OH  44115 100 Washington Ave. S.
(216) 687-2319 Suite 2200
Minneapolis, MN  55401
RICHARD M. BRUNELL (612) 339-6900
AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE
2919 Ellicott St., N.W.    
Washington, DC  20008
(617) 435-6464
January 3, 2011
iCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, the American Antitrust Institute 
states that it is a nonprofit corporation and, as such, no entity has any 
ownership interest in it.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................... iv
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE...........................................................1
FED. R. APP. P. 29(a) STATEMENT......................................................1
FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5) STATEMENT .................................................2
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................2
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRODUCTS AT ISSUE
ARE CLOSELY INTERCHANGEABLE ECONOMIC 
SUBSTITUTES............................................................................5
II. IN DETERMINING THE RELEVANT MARKET, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED BY IGNORING NON-PRICE 
COMPETITION...........................................................................7
A. Quality Competition and Innovation are
Core Antitrust Values .........................................................8
B. Continental Can and Tenet Health Care
Control This Case ............................................................. 11
C. The Acquisition Caused Consumer Harm From
the Loss of Non-Price Competition................................... 13
D. The Court’s Holding Potentially Has
Far-Reaching Consequences............................................. 14
iii
III. THE COURT’S MARKET DEFINITION FAILED TO
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT AN INDEPENDENTLY
OWNED NEOPROFEN WOULD HAVE BEEN A
CONSTRAINT ON LUNDBECK’S PRICING..............................16
IV. THE COURT’S MARKET DEFINITION AND THE
ELASTICITY FINDING ON WHICH IT DEPENDS
CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH THE REST OF ITS
FACT FINDINGS ..........................................................................18
A. The Elasticity Finding is Deeply Suspect on Its Face............19
B. The Elasticity Finding Conflicts With the Remainder
of the Opinion.......................................................................23
C. Lundbeck’s Efforts to Convince Doctors to Switch to 
NeoProfen Would Make No Sense Unless the Products
Were Antitrust Substitutes ....................................................26
D. The Court Misapplied Elementary Principles of 
Market Definition .................................................................28
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................30
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................................31
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases                                                                                                  Page
Aspen Skiiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585 (1985) .....................................................................8
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1 (1979) ........................................................................9
*Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).......... 8,10,18,29
Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co.,
290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002) ........................................................9
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451 (1992) .............................................................. 17,23
FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)....................... 3,8
*FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp.,
186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) ............................................... 12,19
FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc.,
2009 WL 2215006 (D. Minn. 2009) ........................................... 19
General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp.,
810 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1987) ...................................................... 18
Glen Holly Ent., Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc.,
343 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) ......................................................9
Hawaii ex rel. Anzai v. Gannett Pac. Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Haw. 1999),
aff’d, 203 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1999) ............................................. 15
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.  v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986) ................................................................... 26
vMcLaughlin Equip. Co. v. Servaas,
2004 WL 1629603 (S.D. Ind. 2004) ........................................... 21
Midwestern Mach., Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,
167 F.3d 439 (8th Cir. 1999) ...................................................... 18
Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291 (8th Cir. 1994) ........................... 19
Nat’l Collegiate Athl. Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) .........8
Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns,
Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Colo. 2004) ................................ 22
Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................ 29
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc.,
129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009)...................................................................1
Reilly v. MediaNews Group, Inc.,
2007 WL 1068202 (N.D. Cal. 2007)........................................... 15
Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem’l Park Cemetery Ass’n,
666 F.2d 1130 (8th Cir. 1981) ......................................................9
United States v. Alum. Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) ........... 23
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
866 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1988) ................................................... 8,28
*United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441 (1964) ................................................ 3,7-8,11,12,18
United States v. Daily Gazette Co.,
567 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D.W.Va. 2008) ...................................... 15
United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005)...........9
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377 (1956) ................................................................... 25
vi
United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 1997)....... 20
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)........................... 17
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ........... 23
United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 363 (1968)....... 10,14
Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990) ............................9
Statutes
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 ..........................................3,4,8,10,12,18,30
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2....................................................... 3,4,23,30
Other Authorities
Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Antitrust L.,
Econometrics: Legal, Practical, and Technical Issues (2005) .... 21
Am. Bar Ass’n, Sect. of Antitrust L., Market Power Handbook (2005) 22
Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law (3d ed. 2007)........................ 17,21
Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice”
Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 Antitrust L. J. 175 (2007) .......... 10
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview,
74 Antitrust L.J. 129 (2007)...................................................28-29
Andrew M. Rosenfeld, The Use of Economics in Antitrust
Litigation and Counseling, 1986 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 49........... 21
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992)....................................10-11
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010).................................... 11,20
1INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The American Antitrust Institute (“AAI”) is an independent non-profit 
educational, research, and advocacy organization devoted to advancing the 
role of competition in the economy, protecting consumers, and sustaining 
the vitality of the antitrust laws. The AAI is managed by its Board of 
Directors, with the guidance of an Advisory Board that consists of over 115
prominent antitrust lawyers, law professors, economists, and business 
leaders. See http://www.antitrustinstitute.org.  The AAI frequently appears 
as amicus curiae, and presented oral argument in Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. 
linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009).  The Board of Directors is 
particularly concerned that the opinion below entirely disregards non-price 
competition, potentially immunizing anticompetitive conduct in 
pharmaceutical and other markets in which price competition may be 
attenuated, and that it sets too high a standard for considering price effects in 
a monopoly-preserving merger.1
FED. R. APP. P. 29(a) STATEMENT
The AAI has the consent of all the parties, Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Federal Trade Commission and State of Minnesota, and Defendant-Appellee 
                                               
1 The AAI’s Board of Directors alone has approved the filing of this brief; 
the individual views of members of the Advisory Board may differ from 
AAI’s positions.
2Lundbeck, Inc., to submit this amicus brief.  
FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5) STATEMENT
No counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no party, party’s counsel, or any other person or entity – other than the AAI 
or its counsel – has contributed money that was intended to fund preparing 
or submitting this brief.  Certain members of AAI’s Advisory Board 
represent plaintiffs in related litigation against Lundbeck, but they played no 
role in drafting or funding the brief, nor participated in the AAI Board of 
Directors’ deliberations over the brief.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The basis for the District Court’s ruling was its view that cross-price 
elasticity of demand was “very low” between the two drugs acquired by 
Lundbeck, and therefore that they could not be in the same relevant market.2  
AAI urges reversal on three grounds.  First, assuming arguendo that cross-
price elasticity was low – even if it were zero – the court’s approach 
fundamentally misapprehended the law.  A lack of price competition 
between two functionally interchangeable products does not preclude a 
determination that they are in the same relevant market.  Second, regardless 
of “low” cross-price elasticity, the acquisition removed an actual or potential 
                                               
2 Following the District Court, we refer to Appellee-Defendant Lundbeck 
and its predecessor Ovation, Inc. as “Lundbeck.”
3constraint on a monopolist’s ability to exercise monopoly power and was 
therefore anticompetitive and illegal under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  And third, the court’s finding of “low” cross-
price elasticity should be rejected because it cannot be reconciled with the 
rest of its findings and is otherwise riddled with errors.
Strictly speaking, the court made a “cross-elasticity” finding only 
indirectly, extrapolating from an institutional peculiarity.  The court believed 
that because many doctors choose drugs based on quality rather than price, 
hospitals that actually purchase the drugs and choose whether to stock them 
in their formularies would be unable to foster price competition among drug 
manufacturers.  And yet, on every other dimension the court’s findings show 
the products to be closely interchangeable economic substitutes.  Moreover, 
much of the court’s own reasoning was based on doctors’ differing views as 
to safety and side effects.  That is to say, the court found as a fact that these 
products compete head to head on the basis of quality.  The ruling therefore 
directly conflicts with United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 
(1964), and FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), which 
hold that antitrust law protects quality competition as well as price 
competition.  Quality competition benefits consumers in its own right, and it 
4drives innovation. Indeed, it is where price competition lacks vigor that 
non-price competition is most important.
With respect to price competition, the court essentially placed the 
burden on the government to prove that but for the acquisition, the two 
products would have competed on price.  However, even if price were the 
only concern, that is too stringent a test.  Under the incipiency standard of 
Section 7, and Section 2’s heightened concern over acquisitions by 
monopolists, it is sufficient that Lundbeck has preempted the competitive 
constraint that separately owned drugs would have provided.  
Further, even if the evidence supported each of the District Court’s 
findings of fact individually, the cross-elasticity ruling is seriously at odds 
with almost the entire remainder of the opinion.  The court ignored its own 
findings demonstrating that Lundbeck and Abbott both considered that the 
price of each of the products constrained the price of the other.  Moreover, 
on the court’s own findings, a determination of actual cross-price elasticity
would be logically impossible in this case.  It cannot be measured where, as 
here, the products in question were always controlled by the same 
monopolist owner and essentially priced the same.  Finally, the court’s 
conclusion that Lundbeck’s efforts to convince doctors to use NeoProfen 
instead of Indocin would make no sense if the products were in the same 
5relevant market is exactly backwards; Lundbeck’s conduct would be 
economically irrational if the products were not good economic substitutes.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRODUCTS AT ISSUE ARE 
CLOSELY INTERCHANGEABLE ECONOMIC 
SUBSTITUTES
The District Court’s findings demonstrate the following beyond 
serious doubt:  Lundbeck was the maker of two functionally interchangeable 
substitutes that were at best only mildly differentiated, and at the time of the 
challenged acquisition it faced no other competition.  The court summarized 
its own findings as follows:
To treat [the medical condition in question] with drugs in the 
United States, [doctors] may choose Indocin IV, . . . [or a] 
generic [substitute for Indocin IV, which became available only 
in 2010] . . . , or NeoProfen. [Doctors] pick NeoProfen or 
Indocin IV to treat [that condition] for reasons such as 
perceived differences in the drugs’ safety, differences in side 
effects, or the presence or lack of long-term studies.
FF 116.  The findings of fact also show that the medical community 
considered the drugs largely interchangeable, or at any rate lacked consensus 
that one was superior.3  Most hospitals stocked either of the two drugs, but 
                                               
3 The court credited medical experts who considered the drugs 
interchangeable.  FF 98, 102, 103, 105; cf. FF 101.  Moreover, while some 
witnesses preferred one of the drugs, they were divided among those who 
preferred Indocin IV and those who preferred NeoProfen.  Compare FF 100 
6not both.  FF 94.  Lundbeck’s effort to distinguish them in its customers’ 
minds was a high priority, FF 34, 81-87, but its materials show its 
apprehension that customers would not be convinced.  FF 78-80. 
Lundbeck’s best hope for distinguishing NeoProfen was lost when the Food 
& Drug Administration rejected a label for NeoProfen that had been 
proposed by Abbott Laboratories, from which Lundbeck acquired the drug. 
The FDA rejected the label because it would have stated that NeoProfen was 
superior to Indocin IV, and the agency found that claim unsubstantiated.  FF 
61.  Indeed, despite Lundbeck’s marketing effort, and despite NeoProfen’s 
alleged superiority, as of the time of the decision below, Indocin IV was still 
prescribed substantially more often than NeoProfen.  FF 94. 
The findings of fact also show that Lundbeck viewed Indocin IV and 
NeoProfen as highly competitive.  Lundbeck estimated that “NeoProfen 
[would] capture a significant portion of the pharmaceutical PDA market at 
the expense of Indocin IV.”  FF 79 (noting expected sales loss “due to new 
                                                                                                                                           
and 108 (preference for Indocin IV) with FF 99, 104, 106, and 107 
(preference for NeoProfen).  The court also credited “[p]ublished clinical 
studies indicat[ing]” that the active ingredients in the two drugs are “equally 
efficacious,” finding as a matter of fact that each of them is “approximately 
75% to 90% effective.”  FF 21.  Finally, the court credited Lundbeck 
internal strategy documents finding that among the reasons that some 
customers discontinued NeoProfen is that “[s]afety advantages (e.g. renal 
function) [were] not perceived as a feature/benefit significant enough to 
replace Indocin IV as the first line therapy . . . .”  FF 84.
7competition (generic entry and NeoProfen).”); see also FF 80 (describing 
“competitive threats” to Indocin IV from NeoProfen).  Indeed, the basic 
rationale for the acquisition was that “[a]cquiring NeoProfen will allow us to 
cannibalize our Indocin IV sales in a controlled manner, retain sales for both 
products and continue to grow total company sales in the PDA market with 
an exclusively protected product.” FF 79.
In short, these two products were designed for the same use, and 
despite whatever differentiation they may actually possess, they were 
economic substitutes in the sense that sales of one came directly at the 
expense of the other.
II. IN DETERMINING THE RELEVANT MARKET, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY IGNORING NON-PRICE COMPETITION 
The result below rested entirely on the District Court’s finding that 
cross-price elasticity between the two drugs was “very low” and therefore 
the products could not be in the same relevant market.  Even assuming 
arguendo that cross-price elasticity was low, it does not follow that they are 
in different product markets.  Despite the court’s apparently contrary view, 
core values protected by our antitrust law include quality competition and 
innovation over time.  As the Supreme Court explained in Continental Can:
Interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand are not 
to be used to obscure competition but to “recognize competition 
where, in fact, competition exists.” 
8378 U.S. at 453 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
326 (1962)); accord United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 
242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988).  Like the trial court in Continental Can, the court 
here “employed an unduly narrow construction of the ‘competition’ 
protected by § 7 and of ‘reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-
elasticity of demand’ in judging the facts of this case.”  378 U.S. at 452.
A. Quality Competition and Innovation are Core Antitrust 
Values 
Quality competition and consumer choice are values protected by the 
antitrust laws, even in the absence of price competitiveness in a given 
market.  The Supreme Court has so held many times.  See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. 
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459-60 (1986) (a “refusal to compete with 
respect to the package of services . . . , no less than a refusal to compete with 
respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the ability of the market to 
advance social welfare”); Aspen Skiiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-07, 610 (1985) (noting harm from the 
unavailability of the all-Aspen ticket, which deprived consumers of the 
ability to “make their own choice on these matters of quality”); Nat’l 
Collegiate Athl. Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (finding 
that athletic association’s actions “can be viewed as procompetitive” because 
9they “widen consumer choice”); cf. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. 
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (treating musical composers as horizontal 
competitors even though price competition likely lacking).
The significance of non-price competition has been reaffirmed by this 
Court, see, e.g., Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem’l Park Cemetery Ass’n,
666 F.2d 1130, 1138 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding trade association rule illegal 
because it “stunts rather than develops trade . . . and limits consumer 
choice”), and by the other Circuits, see, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 
Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 194 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding it “anticompetitive [to] . . . 
limit[] the choices of products open to dental laboratories.”); Conwood Co., 
L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 789 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding 
antitrust injury where conduct “caused higher prices and reduced consumer 
choice, both of which are harmful to competition”); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n,
895 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1990) (boycott by doctors of chiropractors was 
“anticompetitive [because it] . . . interfere[s] with the consumer’s free choice 
to take the product of his liking”); Glen Holly Ent., Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc.,
343 F.3d 1000, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting definition of “antitrust 
injury” that would recognize only increased price or decreased innovation; 
finding antitrust injury because defendant’s conduct “detrimentally changed 
the market make-up and limited consumers’ choice to one source of 
10
output.”); see generally Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the 
“Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 Antitrust L. J. 175, 189-
91 & nn. 45-48 (2007) (citing cases).
Non-price competition has been of particular concern in merger 
review under § 7 because “expansion through merger is more likely to 
reduce available consumer choice while providing no increase in industry 
capacity, jobs or output.”  Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 345 n.72; see also 
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 363, 368 (1968) 
(finding a bank merger illegal under § 7 because it would limit consumer 
choice as to “price, variety of credit arrangements, convenience of location, 
attractiveness of physical surroundings, credit information, investment 
advice, service charges, personal accommodations, advertising, [and] 
miscellaneous special and extra services.”). 
For more than two decades the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have 
recognized that mergers may be anticompetitive when they reduce non-price 
competition.  When the antitrust enforcement agencies first issued joint 
merger guidelines in 1992, they took the view that, in addition to their power 
over price, “[s]ellers with market power . . . may lessen competition on 
dimensions other than price, such as product quality, service, or innovation.”  
11
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 n.6 
(1992).  The revised Guidelines of 2010 go further:  
Enhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price 
terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including 
reduced product quality, reduced product variety, reduced 
service, or diminished innovation.  Such non-price effects may 
coexist with price effects, or can arise in their absence. . . . [The 
agencies’ usual market definition methodology, which focuses 
on “small but significant and non-transitory” price changes,] is 
used because normally it is possible to quantify [such changes,] 
not because price effects are more important than non-price 
effects. . . . 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§ 1, 4.1.2 
(2010).
B. Continental Can and Tenet Health Care Control This Case
In particular, two decisions emphasizing these non-price competition 
values, one from the Supreme Court and one from this Circuit, control this 
case.  First, in Continental Can, a maker of metal containers acquired a 
maker of glass containers.  The Court rejected a bench verdict for defendants 
that found glass and metal containers to be in separate product markets.  
Although the trial court found significant non-price competition between the 
metal and glass container industries, it found the acquisition in “the category 
of the conglomerate combination” rather than horizontal.  378 U.S. at 449.  
Because of differences in manufacturing process and end use, the trial court 
thought “the Government failed to make ‘appropriate distinctions . . . 
12
between inter-industry or overall commodity competition and the type of 
competition between products with reasonable interchangeability of use and 
cross-elasticity of demand which has Clayton Act significance.’”  Id. at 448-
49 (quoting District Court).
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding, “that the demand for one 
[product] is not particularly or immediately responsive to changes in the 
price of the other [is] relevant . . . but not determinative of the product 
market issue.”  Id. at 455; see also id. at 450 (noting that “particular user[s] . 
. . do[] not shift back and forth from day to day as price and other factors 
might make desirable”).  The Court canvassed findings and record evidence 
of the marketing and technological innovation efforts of can and glass 
companies to take each other’s market share, concluding that “[t]his [rivalry] 
may not be price competition but is nevertheless meaningful competition 
between interchangeable containers,” id. at 456, and that such competition 
“was of the type and quality deserving of § 7 protection and therefore the 
basis for defining a relevant product market,” id. at 449.
This Court’s decision in FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 
1045 (8th Cir. 1999), is also closely on point and rejects the approach to 
market definition taken in this case.  Tenet reversed a district court’s 
13
geographic market definition for excluding neighboring, but more expensive 
hospitals.  “In so doing,” the district court
underestimated the impact of nonprice competitive factors, such 
as quality. . . .  [O]ne reason for the significant amount of 
migration from the [merging] hospitals to [those excluded from 
the market] is the actual or perceived difference in quality of 
care.  The apparent willingness of Poplar Bluff residents to 
travel for better quality care must be considered. . . .  
[H]ealthcare decisions are based on factors other than price. . . .  
The district court placed an inordinate emphasis on price 
competition without considering the impact of a corresponding 
reduction in quality.
Id. at 1054.
In short, the antitrust laws protect non-price competition as well as 
price competition, which means that functionally interchangeable economic 
substitutes can be in the same relevant market even when consumers are not 
price sensitive.
C. The Acquisition Caused Consumer Harm From the Loss of 
Non-Price Competition
The District Court’s findings demonstrate that Lundbeck’s acquisition
resulted in unambiguous consumer losses apart from any price effects.
“Lundbeck stopped actively promoting Indocin IV” and “instructed its sales 
representatives to focus on Indocin IV’s weaknesses relative to NeoProfen’s 
anticipated benefits.”  FF 81.  This reduction and skewing of information 
was a clear loss to hospitals, doctors, and patients, and a harm to the 
14
competitive process.  Indeed, in the drug field, information about safety and 
effectiveness is critical.  Had Lundbeck not acquired NeoProfen, it would 
have had the incentive not only to promote Indocin IV’s benefits, but to fund 
studies that might aid in that effort, while challenging the claims made for 
NeoProfen.  Moreover, the acquisition caused a loss of incentive to innovate.  
A separate owner of either of the drugs, faced with quality competition, 
would strive to respond with technological innovation and quality 
improvements.  Indeed, the most perverse consequence of the ruling is that it 
is especially where market failure impedes price competition that non-price 
rivalry is most important.  
D. The Court’s Holding Has Potentially Far-Reaching 
Consequences
The District Court’s holding has potentially far-reaching 
consequences in other markets where competition occurs primarily, or 
exclusively, over non-price attributes.  First, by the court’s own findings of 
fact, price-competitiveness is likely to be attenuated as to most prescription 
drugs and for that matter as to most health care services.  Failure to take 
account of non-price competition therefore could effectively exempt a fair 
portion of the health care sector from the antitrust laws.  Cf. Phila. Nat’l 
Bank, 374 U.S. at 350 (repeals of antitrust by implication are “strongly 
disfavored”).
15
The District Court’s ruling would also have consequences in non-
health-care markets.  For example, it implies that the DOJ and FTC would 
be precluded from weighing the effect of Internet and other media mergers 
on consumers where the services are free (there is no cross-price elasticity
between products that are free). It would also preclude consideration of lost 
editorial diversity or content in newspaper and media mergers, in which non-
price competition is routinely considered. See, e.g., United States v. Daily 
Gazette Co., 567 F. Supp. 2d 859, 870 (S.D.W.Va. 2008); Reilly v. 
MediaNews Group, Inc., 2007 WL 1068202, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Hawaii 
ex rel. Anzai v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1249-50 (D. Haw. 
1999), aff’d, 203 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding newspaper merger illegal 
that would, among other things, “deprive newspaper readers of free and open 
competition in the sale of daily newspapers and their differing editorial and 
reportorial voices”).
Moreover, in any case in which price competitiveness is dampened, 
but consumers value choice among non-price attributes, the District Court’s 
ruling would produce this strange result:  sellers of differentiated substitutes 
with low cross-price elasticity could enter into market allocation agreements 
without risk of antitrust liability because they are not horizontal competitors, 
as the products are not in the same relevant market.  Lundbeck, for example, 
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rather than acquiring NeoProfen from Abbott Laboratories, might have just 
agreed with Abbott that each would sell only to selected hospitals, even 
though such an agreement between horizontal competitors would be plainly 
illegal, and the loss of choice would reflect real consumer injury given the 
District Court’s findings that many doctors prefer one or the other of the two 
drugs.
III. THE COURT’S MARKET DEFINITION FAILED TO TAKE 
INTO ACCOUNT THAT AN INDEPENDENTLY OWNED 
NEOPROFEN WOULD HAVE BEEN A CONSTRAINT ON 
LUNDBECK’S PRICING
Even assuming arguendo that non-price competition is legally 
irrelevant, the District Court was wrong to conclude that “low” cross-price 
elasticity precluded the inclusion of both Indocin IV and NeoProfen in the 
same product market.  The fact that an independently owned NeoProfen 
would have been a constraint on Lundbeck’s pricing – indeed, the only 
competitive constraint – is sufficient to place it in the same relevant market.  
Cross-price elasticity does not exist in a vacuum; it is a measure of 
substitutability of two products at particular prices.  See infra.  When the 
court found that cross-elasticity here was “low,” it did not specify what that 
meant or conclude that it was so low that the potential anticompetitive 
effects at issue in the case could not occur.  On the contrary, it is clear that 
NeoProfen was Indocin IV’s next-closest substitute, see FF 11, 12 (surgery 
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is “second-line” treatment of PDA and significantly more expensive than 
drugs), and that an independently owned NeoProfen would have set a ceiling 
on Lundbeck’s pricing of Indocin IV, and vice versa.  Indeed, the court 
recognized this constraint explicitly when it found that, “When launching 
NeoProfen, an independent owner would not have disregarded Indocin IV’s 
price.”  FF 63.  In contrast, a common owner can raise or maintain the price 
of one of the drugs, knowing that the lower sales will be recaptured by the 
other, as Lundbeck was well aware.  FF 79 (“Acquiring NeoProfen will 
allow us to cannibalize our Indocin IV sales in a controlled manner”).
The elimination by merger of an actual or potential price constraint on 
a monopolist is anticompetitive, regardless of whether Indocin IV and 
NeoProfen are considered to be in same relevant market.  See Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15 (1992)
(“Whether considered in the conceptual category of ‘market definition’ or 
‘market power,’ the ultimate inquiry is the same—whether . . . [one] market 
will significantly restrain power in the [other] markets.”); 3 Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 701d (3d ed. 2008) 
(monopolist’s “acquisition of any firm that has the economic capabilities for 
entry and is a more-than-fanciful possible entrant is presumptively 
anticompetitive”); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966) 
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(monopolist’s acquisition was illegal where it “eliminated any possibility of 
an outbreak of competition that might have occurred”).  
In any event, a proper definition of the relevant market would 
recognize such a competitive constraint.  See General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz 
Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 805 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Defining a relevant 
product market is primarily a process of describing those groups of 
producers which, because of the similarity of their products, have the 
ability—actual or potential—to take significant amounts of business away 
from each other.”) (internal quote marks omitted) (emphasis added).  A 
failure to recognize such a constraint would also be inconsistent with Section 
7’s “incipiency” mandate.  See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 323 n.39 (1962) (Section 7 of the Clayton Act is designed to protect 
against anticompetitive dangers “in their incipiency”); accord Midwestern 
Mach., Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 167 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1999).
IV. THE COURT’S MARKET DEFINITION AND THE 
ELASTICITY FINDING ON WHICH IT DEPENDS CANNOT 
BE RECONCILED WITH THE REST OF ITS FACT FINDINGS
Finally, this Court should not accept the District Court’s market 
definition because the finding of low cross-price elasticity cannot be 
reconciled with the facts as found and is riddled with other errors.  See
Continental Can, 378 U.S. at 447-58 (reversing judgment as matter of law 
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because trial court’s own findings of fact did not support its market 
definition); Tenet, 186 F.3d at 1053-55 (reversing preliminary injunction 
because trial court’s own findings of fact conflicted with its market 
definition); see also Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1295-97 (8th Cir. 
1994) (reversing permanent injunction in jury trial, where market definition 
was based on expert opinion but “indisputable record facts contradict or 
otherwise render the opinion unreasonable”).
A . The Elasticity Finding is Deeply Suspect on Its Face
The elasticity finding depended on the informal opinion of a 
Lundbeck expert, FF115,4 and implicitly on the testimony of eight doctors 
who said they do not consider the price of the drug if there is a meaningful 
difference in safety or effectiveness.  However, the court’s other findings of 
fact demonstrate that a substantial number of doctors were largely 
indifferent between the two drugs.  See infra note 3.  In any event, even if 
                                               
4 Even though the court found as a fact that cross-price elasticity is “very 
low,” FF 116, the court may have meant to imply that its ultimate finding 
rested merely on Plaintiffs’ burden of proof.  According to the court, 
Plaintiffs’ economic expert did not offer an opinion as to cross-elasticity.  FF 
114; cf. FF 111.  Yet, in its denial of Lundbeck’s motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court recognized that even the total absence of cross-
elasticity evidence does not preclude a finding in favor of Plaintiffs’ 
proposed market.  FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 2009 WL 2215006, at *2 n.2  (D. 
Minn., July 21, 2009).  Moreover, if the failure of proof were the court’s 
rationale, it would be error because, as we will explain, it would be literally 
impossible in this case for either party accurately to estimate cross-elasticity. 
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most consumers are not price sensitive, that does not in itself prove that 
cross-price elasticity is low.  See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 
1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is possible for only a few customers who 
switch to alternatives to make [a] price increase unprofitable, thereby 
protecting a larger number of customers who would have acquiesced in 
higher prices.”).  Further, the fact that doctors, not surprisingly, may not 
focus on price, does not mean that cross-price elasticity is low with respect 
to hospitals – which clearly are price sensitive and make the actual purchase 
decisions – or that no hospital would be in a position to seek lower prices for 
itself.  Cf. 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 3 (“Where price 
discrimination is feasible, adverse competitive effects on targeted customers 
can arise, even if such effects will not arise for other customers.”).5
The expert’s opinion was admittedly not based on statistical or econometric 
                                               
5 The court’s findings recognize that hospitals are price sensitive, FF 93, 
and they (not doctors) make the actual drug purchases, FF 88, and that 
Lundbeck sought to influence non-physician members of hospital pharmacy 
and therapeutics committees to gain access to hospital formularies, FF 83. 
The court nonetheless concluded that “neonatologists are the relevant 
consumers.”  FF 113 (emphasis added).  This was error because the question 
isn’t an either/or issue.  Plainly, while doctors are influential, the courts 
findings demonstrate that hospitals play at least a significant role, and the 
court failed to explain why hospitals could not make purchase decisions 
based on price by persuading indifferent doctors to use one drug or other, as 
Lundbeck itself sought to do.  See FF 85.
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analysis of any evidence.6  Indeed, any estimate of the actual cross-price 
elasticity in this case would be impossible.  Economists define cross-price 
elasticity as the percentage change in the quantity demanded for a product 
associated with each one-percent change in the price of another product. See
2B Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 507a (3d ed. 2007).  In antitrust 
litigation it is estimated either by calculation of a simple statistical 
correlation between price changes over time or, in the less common case in 
which sufficient data are available, by econometric study of the relation 
between prices.  Either approach presupposes the availability of data 
showing the behavior of the two products when the price of one of them 
changes.  See Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Antitrust L., Econometrics: Legal, 
Practical, and Technical Issues 269-309 (2005); Andrew M. Rosenfeld, The 
Use of Economics in Antitrust Litigation and Counseling, 1986 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 49, 63-67.
                                               
6 According to the court, the expert “did not calculate a specific cross-
price elasticity between NeoProfen and Indocin IV, [but] he testified that 
that it is very low.”  FF 115.  In fact, he offered his opinion only at trial, in 
reply to a question asked by the court, id., and no written report or statement 
by him is apparently in evidence.  Even on Lundbeck’s characterization of 
his testimony, the most he did was speculate on the basis of his perception of 
an institutional market failure.  Def.’s Post Trial Br. at 4-5. Other courts 
have held such unsupported expert testimony not even admissible under 
Daubert, much less as sufficient to support fact findings.  See, e.g.,
McLaughlin Equip. Co. v. Servaas, 2004 WL 1629603, at *6 (S.D. Ind. 
2004) (“It is insufficient for an expert to merely mention cross-elasticity of 
demand or supply; an analysis is required.”).
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Such a procedure would be impossible in this case. Prior to July 
2006, only Indocin IV was available, and by that time Lundbeck had already 
raised its price to $1500 per three-vial course of treatment.  FF 57.  When 
Lundbeck introduced NeoProfen in July 2006, it offered the drug at $1450 
per three-vial course of treatment (about one year later raising it to 
$1552.50).  FF 62.  In another case that addressed the issue on similar facts, 
the court ruled that proof of cross-elasticity cannot be demanded of the 
plaintiff because without price variation it cannot be measured.  See Nobody 
in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 
2d 1048, 1082 (D. Colo. 2004).
Moreover, during the entire short period of their “competition” with 
one another, NeoProfen and Indocin IV were both owned by the same 
monopolist.  A monopolist that owns the only two substitutes in a given 
market has no incentive to price them competitively with each other or with 
other products.  Where, as here, they have always been priced by the same 
monopolist, any estimate of their cross-price elasticity will be severely 
flawed by an amplified version of the Cellophane fallacy—the mistake of 
inferring cross-elasticity (or lack thereof) in a case where one or more 
products was already being sold at a non-competitive price. See Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Sect. of Antitrust L., Market Power Handbook 59-60 (2005) 
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(describing the Cellophane fallacy); Kodak, 504 U.S. at 471 (“The existence 
of significant substitution in the event of further price increases or even at 
the current price does not tell us whether the defendant already exercises 
significant market power.”).
Additionally, it is black letter law that when defining markets, courts 
should refrain from giving monopolists the benefit of inferences from facts 
peculiarly in their own control.  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“To require that § 2 liability turn on a 
plaintiff’s ability or inability to reconstruct the hypothetical marketplace 
absent a defendant’s anticompetitive conduct would only encourage 
monopolists to take more and earlier anticompetitive action.”); United States 
v. Alum. Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1945) (excluding 
“secondary” aluminum ingot from defendant Alcoa’s market because Alcoa 
had some control over how much secondary there could be). 
B. The Elasticity Finding Conflicts With the Remainder of the 
Opinion
The District Court’s finding of low cross-price elasticity also conflicts 
with other findings of fact.  The fact that “[w]hen launching NeoProfen, an 
independent owner would not have disregarded Indocin IV’s price,”  FF 63, 
is evidence of significant cross-price elasticity.  Moreover, upon the 2006 
introduction of its new NeoProfen product, Lundbeck itself keyed the price 
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of NeoProfen to the price of its existing Indocin product, minus a 3% 
discount, to “[a]llow [sales] rep[resentatives] to spend more time selling 
product differentiation in the NICU vs. spending time with the pharmacy 
director on price . . . .”  FF 82; see id. (also noting that small discount “will 
not convert the economic driven vial splitting crowd”).  Also, the court 
found that, though Lundbeck always intended to increase the price of 
Indocin IV after its acquisition, Lundbeck deliberately chose not to do so 
until after it had completed negotiations with Abbott Laboratories for the 
acquisition of NeoProfen.  “Lundbeck was concerned that Abbott 
Laboratories would demand a higher price for the rights to NeoProfen if the 
announcement of Indocin IV’s price increase took place before Lundbeck’s 
acquisition of the rights to NeoProfen.”  FF 58.  But why would Abbott do 
any such thing if the two products were not price competitors?
The court also found that in Lundbeck’s internal strategic analyses, 
including in a presentation to its controlling shareholder, it perceived the two 
drugs to be in direct price competition.  See FF 79 (combining the two 
products was expected to “allow us to cannibalize our Indocin IV sales in a 
controlled manner . . . and continue to grow total company sales in the PDA 
market”); FF 80 (combination would “allow Lundbeck to realize a more 
stable revenue stream for both products within the PDA market”); FF 82 
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(NeoProfen introduced with a 3% discount to Indocin IV to “take[] away 
potential pharmaeconomic debate”); FF 84 (reasons that some customers 
were not ordering NeoProfen included “Price”).
At trial, Lundbeck stressed one other point extensively, and the 
District Court found it as a fact, but it turns out to show quite the opposite of 
what Lundbeck urges.  Abbott Laboratories, the previous owner of 
NeoProfen, had intended to introduce NeoProfen at a price significantly 
higher than the then-prevailing price of its only competitor, Indocin IV.  FF 
61.  Lundbeck stressed that this fact proved that the two drugs do not 
compete as to price.  This argument is incorrect for at least two reasons.  
First, that Abbott might have charged more for NeoProfen than Indocin IV
would show at most that they are not perfect substitutes.  It is elementary 
that products can be in the same product market without being perfect 
substitutes.  See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 
(Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956) (antitrust does not “require that 
products be fungible to be considered in the relevant market”).  Second,
Abbott’s higher price projection was based on Abbott’s anticipation that the 
Food & Drug Administration would approve a label for NeoProfen stating 
its superiority over Indocin IV.  But, as mentioned above, the agency 
ultimately rejected such a label.  FF 16, 36, 61.
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C. Lundbeck’s Efforts to Convince Doctors to Switch to
NeoProfen Would Make No Sense Unless the Products 
Were Antitrust Substitutes 
Lundbeck’s marketing strategy, to “accelerate the conversion of first-
line PDA treatment from Indocin IV to [NeoProfen],” FF 80, would make no 
sense if the products were not economic substitutes.  A finding of seriously 
irrational behavior calls at least for some explanation, but the court failed 
utterly to supply it. As this Court has recognized, a finding of behavior 
“contrary to [the actor’s] economic interests . . . is suspect,” Tenet, 186 F.3d 
at 1054, because “antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences 
from ambiguous evidence,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.  v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
Lundbeck was the owner of two separate products, which it acquired 
for tens of millions of dollars.  Absent other explanation, its rational strategy 
would be to maximize the joint profit from selling both.  And yet, it did 
something very different.  The company invested several million additional 
dollars in a marketing effort to differentiate the two products on the basis of 
safety and side effects.7  But if the products were not antitrust substitutes, a 
                                               
7 Lundbeck established a massive, direct-sales marketing effort involving 
dozens of its own sales personnel and scores more from Abbott Laboratories 
(for which Lundbeck paid $2 million), to convince customers of 
NeoProfen’s superiority.  FF 34, 81-87.  
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rational firm would not waste money trying to convince consumers that they 
differ; consumers would already know.
More important, Lundbeck spent significant sums to acquire those two 
separate drugs to treat the same condition, within six months of one another, 
but then devoted itself to disparaging one of them to its consumers.  FF 81.  
There is no reason to believe on the court’s fact findings that sales of 
NeoProfen should benefit Lundbeck any more than sales of Indocin, except 
for the anticompetitive reason we elaborate below. It would be peculiar 
indeed for the supplier of two separate, non-competing products, neither of 
which promises a greater margin than the other, to discourage sales of either.  
In this case Lundbeck not only did that, but apparently sought to kill off 
demand for one of them altogether.
The District Court observed that “[w]ere NeoProfen and Indocin IV in 
the same product market,” the push to discourage Indocin IV “would not 
make sense.” FF 116.  But in fact, it made perfect sense.  Lundbeck sought 
to convert Indocin users to NeoProfen because it expected generic 
competition to Indocin, which would take more sales away from Indocin 
than from NeoProfen.  FF 64.  The more it could differentiate NeoProfen in 
the minds of customers, the more it could insulate NeoProfen from generic 
competition.
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D. The Court Misapplied Elementary Principles of Market 
Definition 
The District Court evidently believed that Indocin IV and NeoProfen 
could not be in the same relevant product market if they would be affected 
differently by the entry of generic Indocin, or if they were “distinct.”  See FF 
116 (concluding in penultimate sentence, “NeoProfen are Indocin IV are 
distinct; their side effects differ.”).  This reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding about market definition.  In particular, the court failed to 
appreciate that a product market might be defined differently in two different 
cases, even though they involve the same products, or that there can be a 
broader relevant market that encompasses a smaller relevant market.
For example, in a merger between two identical versions of a product, 
a non-merging differentiated product might be excluded because it does not 
sufficiently constrain the ability of the merged firm to exercise market 
power.  See, e.g., Archer-Daniels-Midland, 866 F.2d at 243 (in acquisition 
of high fructose corn syrup plants by HFCS maker, sugar was not in the 
same relevant market as HFCS).  However, in a merger in which the 
differentiated product is in fact being acquired, the differentiated products 
may be in the same market because products outside that wider market do 
not sufficiently constrain a hypothetical monopolist in the wider market.  See
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 Antitrust 
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L.J. 129, 148 (2007) (“If one set of products or locations constitute a 
relevant antitrust market, it is likely that one or more larger sets of products 
and locations that encompass the initial market would also be an antitrust 
market.”); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (concept of “submarkets” 
recognizes that narrow market may exist within a broader relevant market); 
e.g., Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing “a 
submarket of the dry sanitizers market is not inherently contradictory with 
recognizing a dry sanitizers market”).
Thus, a merger between Indocin IV and a generic equivalent might 
well exclude NeoProfen from the relevant market, but that is not inconsistent 
with a relevant market here that includes both NeoProfen and Indocin IV.  A 
related problem is that the court was apparently led astray by Lundbeck in 
assuming that only if consumers switched products in response to a small 
price increase (5-10%) could the products be considered in the same relevant 
market.  See Def. Lundbeck Inc.’s Post Trial Br. at 37-38, 42-43.  However, 
two products can be in the same relevant market even if a significant price 
increase is required to get consumers to switch, if there are no other better 
substitutes to the products that would constrain a monopolist’s pricing.  See 
Olin, 986 F.2d at 1302 (“a finding of cross-elasticity is not precluded by the 
fact that a higher price increase is necessary to induce a switch”).
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CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that Lundbeck had monopoly power with respect 
to its Indocin IV product, regardless of whether the relevant market included 
NeoProfen.  And there is no dispute that had NeoProfen not been acquired 
by Lundbeck, non-price competition would have flourished.  By its 
acquisition, the monopolist Lundbeck preempted the possibility that price 
competition would also flourish.  Absent extraordinary circumstances not 
present on the record in this case, such a monopoly-protecting merger is 
patently anticompetitive and illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  Accordingly, the decision of the District Court 
should be reversed.
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